

Introduction to Cryptology

Lecture 15

Announcements

- HW6 due today
- HW7 up, due on Thursday, 4/9

Agenda

- Last Time:
 - Authenticated Encryption (4.5)
- This Time:
 - Collision Resistant Hash Functions (5.1)
 - Domain extension for CRHF (5.2)
 - Message Authentication using Hash Functions
 - Hash-and-Mac (5.3.1)
 - HMAC (5.3.2)

Collision Resistant Hashing

Collision Resistant Hashing

Definition: A hash function (with output length ℓ) is a pair of ppt algorithms (Gen, H) satisfying the following:

- Gen takes as input a security parameter 1^n and outputs a key s . We assume that 1^n is implicit in s .
- H takes as input a key s and a string $x \in \{0,1\}^*$ and outputs a string $H^s(x) \in \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$.

If H^s is defined only for inputs $x \in \{0,1\}^{\ell'(n)}$ and $\ell'(n) > \ell(n)$, then we say that (Gen, H) is a fixed-length hash function for inputs of length ℓ' . In this case, we also call H a compression function.

The collision-finding experiment

*Hashcoll*_{A,Π}(*n*):

1. A key s is generated by running $Gen(1^n)$.
2. The adversary A is given s and outputs x, x' . (If Π is a fixed-length hash function for inputs of length $\ell'(n)$, then we require $x, x' \in \{0,1\}^{\ell'(n)}$.)
3. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if and only if $x \neq x'$ and $H^s(x) = H^s(x')$. In such a case we say that A has found a collision.

Security Definition

Definition: A hash function $\Pi = (Gen, H)$ is collision resistant if for all ppt adversaries A there is a negligible function neg such that

$$\Pr[Hashcoll_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1] \leq neg(n).$$

Weaker Notions of Security

- Second preimage or target collision resistance: Given s and a uniform x it is infeasible for a ppt adversary to find $x' \neq x$ such that $H^s(x') = H^s(x)$.
- Preimage resistance: Given s and uniform y it is infeasible for a ppt adversary to find a value x such that $H^s(x) = y$.

Domain Extension

The Merkle-Damgård Transform




FIGURE 5.1: The Merkle-Damgård transform.

The Merkle-Damgard Transform

Let (Gen, h) be a fixed-length hash function for inputs of length $2n$ and with output length n . Construct hash function (Gen, H) as follows:

- Gen : remains unchanged
- H : on input a key s and a string $x \in \{0,1\}^*$ of length $L < 2^n$, do the following:
 1. Set $B := \left\lceil \frac{L}{n} \right\rceil$ (i.e., the number of blocks in x). Pad x with zeros so its length is a multiple of n . Parse the padded result as the sequence of n -bit blocks x_1, \dots, x_B . Set $x_{B+1} := L$, where L is encoded as an n -bit string.
 2. Set $z_0 := 0^n$. (This is also called the IV.)
 3. For $i = 1, \dots, B + 1$, compute $z_i := h^s(z_{i-1} || x_i)$.
 4. Output z_{B+1} .

Security of Merkle-Damgard

Theorem: If (Gen, h) is collision resistant, then so is (Gen, H) .

Message Authentication Using Hash Functions

Hash-and-Mac Construction

Let $\Pi = (Mac, Vrfy)$ be a MAC for messages of length $\ell(n)$, and let $\Pi_H = (Gen_H, H)$ be a hash function with output length $\ell(n)$. Construct a MAC $\Pi' = (Gen', Mac', Vrfy')$ for arbitrary-length messages as follows:

- Gen' : on input 1^n , choose uniform $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ and run $Gen_H(1^n)$ to obtain s . The key is $k' := \langle k, s \rangle$.
- Mac' : on input a key $\langle k, s \rangle$ and a message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, output $t \leftarrow Mac_k(H^s(m))$.
- $Vrfy'$: on input a key $\langle k, s \rangle$, a message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, and a MAC tag t , output 1 if and only if $Vrfy_k(H^s(m), t) = 1$.

Security of Hash-and-MAC

Theorem: If Π is a secure MAC for messages of length ℓ and Π_H is collision resistant, then the construction above is a secure MAC for **arbitrary-length** messages.

Proof Intuition

Let Q be the set of messages m queried by adversary A .

Assume A manages to forge a tag for a message $m^* \notin Q$.

There are two cases to consider:

1. $H^S(m^*) = H^S(m)$ for some message $m \in Q$.
Then A breaks **collision resistance** of H^S .
2. $H^S(m^*) \neq H^S(m)$ for all messages $m \in Q$.
Then A forges a valid tag with respect to MAC Π .

Can we construct a MAC from only CRHF?

Attempt: $Mac_k(m) = H(k||m)$.

Is this secure?

NO. Why not?

Instead, we will try 2 layers of hashing.