Information Theoretic Security

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Security in Wireless Systems

- Inherent openness in wireless communications channel: eavesdropping and jamming attacks

![Diagram showing Alice, Bob, and Eve in a wireless communication system with signal overlap and potential interception points.]

Bob

Eve

Alice
Countering Security Threats in Wireless Systems

- **Cryptography**
  - at higher layers of the protocol stack
  - based on the assumption of *limited computational power* at Eve
  - vulnerable to large-scale implementation of quantum computers

- **Techniques like frequency hopping, CDMA**
  - at the physical layer
  - based on the assumption of *limited knowledge* at Eve
  - vulnerable to rogue or captured node events

- **Information theoretic security**
  - at the physical layer
  - no assumption on Eve’s computational power
  - no assumption on Eve’s available information
  - *unbreakable, provable, and quantifiable* (in bits/sec/hertz)
  - implementable by signal processing, communications, and coding techniques

- Combining all: multi-dimensional, multi-faceted, cross-layer security
Shannon’s 1949 Security Paper

- Noiseless bit pipes to Bob and Eve
- Introduces one-time pad
  \[ Y = X \oplus K \]
- If \( K \) is uniform and independent of \( X \), then \( Y \) is independent of \( X \)
- If we know \( K \), then \( X = Y \oplus K \)
- For perfect secrecy, length of \( K \) (key rate) must be as large as length of \( X \) (message rate)
- Two implications:
  - Need “absolutely secure” links to exchange keys
  - Need constant rates (equal to message rate) on these links
- Beginning of cryptography
Private Key Cryptography

- Based on one-time pad
- There are separate secure communication links for key exchange
- Encryption and decryption are done using these keys
- Hard to construct “absolutely secure” links
- Hard to distribute and maintain secure keys
  - Especially in wireless and/or infrastructureless networks, i.e., ad-hoc and sensor networks
- Number of keys rapidly increases with the number of nodes
  - Need a distinct key for each transmitter-receiver pair
Public Key Cryptography

- Encryption is based on publicly known key (or method)
- Decryption can be performed only by the desired destination
- No need for “absolutely secure” links to distribute and maintain keys
- Security based on computational advantage
- Security against computationally limited adversaries

- **Basic idea:** Certain operations are easy in one direction, difficult in the other direction
  - Multiplication is easy, factoring is difficult (**RSA**)
  - Exponentiation is easy, discrete logarithm is difficult (**Diffie-Hellman**)


Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)

- Choose two large integers $p$ and $q$. Let $n = pq$ and $\phi = (p - 1)(q - 1)$.
- Choose two numbers $D$ and $E$ such that $DE \mod \phi = 1$. Also, $E$ is co-prime with $\phi$.
- Make $E$ and $n$ public.
- E is the encryption key, which is publicly known. $D$ is the decryption key.
- Alice wants to send a message $m$ (which is a number between 0 and $n - 1$) to Bob.
- Alice calculates $c = m^E$ and sends it.
- Bob, knowing $D$, calculates $c^D = m^{DE}$ in mod $n$.
- It is known that $m^{DE} \mod n = m$, hence Bob gets the message.
- For Eve to decode the message, she needs $D$.
- To find $D$, Eve needs to factor $n$ into $p$ and $q$, and calculate $\phi$, and knowing $E$, find $D$.
- Factoring a large integer into its prime multipliers is known to be a difficult problem.
• Alice and Bob wish to settle on a secret key.

• Choose a large base $n$, and an integer $g$.

• Alice chooses a key $k_1$, Bob chooses a key $k_2$.

• Alice calculates $g^{k_1}$ and sends it to Bob.

• Bob calculates $g^{k_2}$ and sends it to Alice.

• Alice raises what she receives from Bob to power $k_1$, and gets $g^{k_1k_2}$.

• Bob raises what he receives from Alice to power $k_2$, and gets $g^{k_1k_2}$.

• Alice and Bob agree on the secret key $g^{k_1k_2}$.

• For Eve to decipher the key, she needs to take discrete logarithms of what she observes.

• Eve needs to find $k_1$ by log($g^{k_1}$) and find $k_2$ by log($g^{k_2}$) and calculate $g^{k_1k_2}$

• Taking the discrete logarithm of a large number is known to be a difficult problem.
Cryptography versus Physical-Layer Security

- Secure Message
- Keys
- Applications
- Bits
- Signals
- Physical Layer
- Cryptography
- Physical Layer
- Secure Bits
- Applications
- Signals
- Physical Layer
- Transmitter
- Physical Layer Approach
Single-User Channel Review

• We first consider the single-user channel:

\[ W \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow \hat{W} \]

Alice

Bob

• Channel is memoryless

\[ p(y^n|x^n) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p(y_i|x_i) \]

• Capacity of a single-user memoryless channel is

\[ C = \max_{p(x)} I(X;Y) \]
Single-User Channel: Achievability

- Fix a $p(x)$. Fill the $2^{nR} \times n$ codebook with i.i.d. realizations:

  \[
  \begin{array}{cccc}
  l & \ldots & \ldots & n \\
  \hline
  \vdots & & & \vdots \\
  W & & & X^n(w) \\
  \vdots & & & \vdots \\
  \hline
  \end{array}
  \]

- Receiver decides $\hat{w}$ is sent, if it is the unique message such that $(x^n(\hat{w}), y^n)$ is jointly typical.

- Probability of error goes to zero as $n \to \infty$, if

\[
R \leq C = \max_{p(x)} I(X;Y)
\]
The converse proof goes as follows

\[ nR = H(W) \]
\[ = I(W; Y^n) + H(W|Y^n) \]
\[ \leq I(W; Y^n) + n\varepsilon_n \]
\[ \leq I(X^n; Y^n) + n\varepsilon_n \]
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(X^n; Y_i|Y^{i-1}) + n\varepsilon_n \]
\[ \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(Y_i) - H(Y_i|X_i) + n\varepsilon_n \]
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(X_i; Y_i) + n\varepsilon_n \]
\[ \leq nC + n\varepsilon_n \]
Wiretap Channel

- Wyner introduced the **wiretap** channel in 1975.
- Major departure from Shannon’s model: **noisy channels**.
- Eve’s channel is **degraded** with respect to Bob’s channel: \( X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z \)

Secrecy is measured by **equivocation**, \( R_e \), at Eve, i.e., the **confusion** at Eve:

\[
R_e = \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} H(W|Z^n)
\]
Notions of Perfect Secrecy

• Perfect secrecy is achieved if \( R_e = R \)

\[
R_e = \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} H(W|Z^n) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} H(W) = R
\]

• Two notions of perfect secrecy.

• **Weak secrecy:** Normalized mutual information vanishes as above

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} I(W;Z^n) = 0
\]

• **Strong secrecy:** Message and Eve’s observation are almost independent

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} I(W;Z^n) = 0
\]

• All capacity results obtained for weak secrecy have been extended for strong secrecy

• However, there is still no proof of equivalence or strict containment
Wyner characterized the optimal $(R, R_e)$ region:

\[
R \leq I(X; Y)
\]
\[
R_e \leq I(X; Y) - I(X; Z)
\]

- Main idea is to split the message $W$ into two coordinates, secret and public: $(W_s, W_p)$.
- $W_s$ needs to be transmitted in perfect secrecy:
  \[
  \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} I(W_s; Z^n) = 0
  \]
- $W_p$ has two roles
  - Carries some information on which there is no secrecy constraint
  - Provides protection for $W_s$
Secrecy Capacity

- Perfect secrecy when $R = R_e$.

- The maximum perfect secrecy rate, i.e., the secrecy capacity:

$$C_s = \max_{X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z} I(X; Y) - I(X; Z)$$

- Main idea is to replace $W_p$ with dummy indices.

- In particular, each $W_s$ is mapped to many codewords:
  - Stochastic encoding (a.k.a. random binning)

- This one-to-many mapping aims to confuse the eavesdropper.
A Typical Capacity-Equivocation Region

- Wyner characterized the optimal \((R, R_e)\) region:
  \[
  R \leq I(X;Y) \\
  R_e \leq I(X;Y) - I(X;Z)
  \]

- A typical \((R, R_e)\) region:

- There might be a tradeoff between rate and its equivocation:
  - Capacity and secrecy capacity might not be simultaneously achievable
Achievability of the Secrecy Capacity-I

- We will show the achievability of the perfect secrecy rate

\[ R_s = I(X; Y) - I(X; Z) \]

- Fix a distribution \( p(x) \)
- Generate \( 2^{n(R_s+\tilde{R}_s)} \) \( x^n \) sequences through \( p(x^n) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p(x_i) \)
- Index these sequences as \( x^n(w_s, \tilde{w}_s) \) where

\[
\begin{align*}
    w_s &\in \{1, \ldots, 2^{nR_s}\} \\
    \tilde{w}_s &\in \{1, \ldots, 2^{n\tilde{R}_s}\}
\end{align*}
\]

- \( w_s \) denotes the actual secret message
- \( \tilde{w}_s \) denotes the protection (confusion) messages with no information content
  - Their sole purpose is to confuse the eavesdropper, i.e., ensure the confidentiality of \( w_s \)
### Achievability of the Secrecy Capacity-II

- Codebook structure and **stochastic encoding**

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
(1,1) & (1,2) & \cdots & (1,j) & \cdots & (1,2^nR_s) \\
(2,1) & (2,2) & \cdots & (2,j) & \cdots & (2,2^nR_s) \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
(i,1) & (i,2) & \cdots & (i,j) & \cdots & (i,2^nR_s) \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
(2^nR_s,1) & (2^nR_s,2) & \cdots & (2^nR_s,j) & \cdots & (2^nR_s,2^nR_s) \\
\end{array}
\]

\[R_s = I(X;Y) - I(X;Z), \quad \tilde{R}_s = I(X;Z)\]
Achievability of the Secrecy Capacity-III

- Recall

\[ R_s = I(X;Y) - I(X;Z) \]

- We set \( \tilde{R}_s \) as

\[ \tilde{R}_s = I(X;Z) \]

- If \( w_s \) is the secret message, select \( \tilde{w}_s \) randomly from \( \{1, \ldots, 2^{n\tilde{R}_s}\} \), and send \( x^n(w_s, \tilde{w}_s) \)

- Legitimate user decides on \( \hat{w}_s \) if \( (x^n(\hat{w}_s, \tilde{w}_s), y^n) \) is jointly typical.

- Legitimate user decodes both the secret message and the dummy message reliably since:

\[ R_s + \tilde{R}_s \leq I(X;Y) \]

- Therefore, the secret message is sent to Bob reliably.

- Next, we show that the secret message is sent perfectly securely also:

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} I(W_s; Z^n) = 0
\]
Achievability of the Secrecy Capacity-IV

- Equivocation calculation.

- We have the following:

  \[ H(W_s|Z^n) = H(W_s, \tilde{W}_s|Z^n) - H(\tilde{W}_s|W_s, Z^n) \]

  \[ = H(W_s, \tilde{W}_s) - I(W_s, \tilde{W}_s; Z^n) - H(\tilde{W}_s|W_s, Z^n) \]

  \[ \geq H(W_s, \tilde{W}_s) - I(X^n; Z^n) - H(\tilde{W}_s|W_s, Z^n) \]

  \[ = H(W_s) + I(\tilde{W}_s) - I(X^n; Z^n) - H(\tilde{W}_s|W_s, Z^n) \]

  which is

  \[ I(W_s; Z^n) \leq I(X^n; Z^n) + H(\tilde{W}_s|W_s, Z^n) - H(\tilde{W}_s) \]

- We treat each term separately
We have

\[ H(\tilde{W}_s) = n\tilde{R}_s = nI(X;Z) \]

We have

\[ I(X^n;Z^n) \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(X_i;Z_i) \leq n(I(X;Z) + \gamma_n) \]

Finally, we consider

\[ H(\tilde{W}_s|W_s,Z^n) \]

Given \( W_s = w_s, x^n(w_s,\tilde{W}_s) \) can take \( 2^{n\tilde{R}_s} \) values where \( \tilde{R}_s = I(X;Z) \)

Thus, the eavesdropper can decode \( \tilde{W}_s \) given \( W_s = w_s \) by looking for the unique \( \tilde{w}_s \) such that \( (x^n(w,s,\tilde{w}_s),Z^n) \) is jointly typical.

Hence, from Fano’s lemma:

\[ H(\tilde{W}_s|W_s,Z^n) \leq n\beta_n \]
Combining all these findings yields
\[
\frac{1}{n} I(W_s; Z^n) \leq \beta_n + \gamma_n
\]
• Since \( \beta_n, \gamma_n \rightarrow 0 \) when \( n \rightarrow \infty \), we have
\[
\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} I(W_s; Z^n) = 0
\]
i.e., perfect secrecy is achieved.
• Thus, \( R_s = I(X; Y) - I(X; Z) \) is an achievable perfect secrecy rate
Achievability of the Entire Rate-Equivocation Region-I

• So far, we showed the achievability of

\[ R_s = I(X; Y) - I(X; Z) \quad R = I(X; Y) - I(X; Z) \]

• We will now show the achievability of

\[ R_s = I(X; Y) - I(X; Z) \quad R = I(X; Y) \]

• In the perfect secrecy case, each secret message \( W_s \) is associated with many codewords

\[ X^n(W_s, \tilde{W}_s) \]

• Legitimate user decodes both \( W_s \) and \( \tilde{W}_s \)

• There is a rate for \( \tilde{W}_s \) which does not carry any information content

• \( \tilde{W}_s \) can be replaced with some information on which there is no secrecy constraint, i.e., it does not need to be confidential:
  – Rate-equivocation region
Achievability of the Entire Rate-Equivocation Region-II

- Each message $W$ is divided into two parts:
  - Secret message $W_s$
  - Public message $W_p$

- We have doubly indexed codewords

$$X^n(W_s, W_p)$$

- We need to show
  - Rate $R = R_s + R_p$ can be delivered to Bob
  - Rate $R_s$ can be kept hidden from Eve
Achievability of the Entire Rate-Equivocation Region-III

- Codebook used to show achievability

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
(1,1) & (1,2) & \ldots & (1,j) & \ldots & (1,2^{nR_p}) \\
(2,1) & (2,2) & \ldots & (2,j) & \ldots & (2,2^{nR_p}) \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
(i,1) & (i,2) & \ldots & (i,j) & \ldots & (i,2^{nR_p}) \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
(2^{nR_s},1) & (2^{nR_s},2) & \ldots & (2^{nR_s},j) & \ldots & (2^{nR_s},2^{nR_p}) \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
R_s = I(X;Y) - I(X;Z), \quad R_p = I(X;Z)
\]
• $R = R_s + R_p$ can be delivered to Bob as long as

\[ R_s + R_p \leq I(X;Y) \]

• We set $R_p$ as

\[ R_p = I(X;Z) \]

• Equivocation calculation:

\[
H(W|Z^n) = H(W_s, W_p|Z^n) \\
= H(W_s, W_p) - I(W_s, W_p; Z^n) \\
\geq H(W_s, W_p) - I(X^n; Z^n) \\
= H(W_s) + H(W_p) - I(X^n; Z^n)
\]

• As $n \to \infty$, $(X^n(w_s, w_p), Z^n)$ will be jointly typical with high probability:

\[ I(X^n; Z^n) \leq nI(X;Z) + n\gamma_n \]
Achievability of the Entire Rate-Equivocation Region-V

- Equivocation computation proceeds as follows

\[
H(W|Z^n) \geq H(W_s) + H(W_p) - nI(X;Z) - n\gamma_n
\]
\[
= H(W_s) - n\gamma_n
\]
\[
= n[I(X;Y) - I(X;Z)] - n\gamma_n
\]

- Thus, we have

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n}H(W|Z^n) \geq I(X;Y) - I(X;Z)
\]

i.e., \( I(X;Y) - I(X;Z) \) is an achievable equivocation rate.

- Therefore, rate \( R = I(X;Y) \) can be achieved with equivocation \( R_e = I(X;Y) - I(X;Z) \).
### Stochastic Encoding: 64-QAM Example-I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bob’s Noise</th>
<th>Eve’s Noise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Bob’s Noise Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Eve’s Noise Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bob’s Constellation</th>
<th>Eve’s Constellation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Bob’s Constellation Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Eve’s Constellation Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
C_B = \log_2 64 = 6 \text{ b/s} \\
C_E = \log_2 16 = 4 \text{ b/s} \\
C_s = C_B - C_E = 2 \text{ b/s}
\]
Stochastic Encoding: 64-QAM Example-II

Message 1
Message 2
Message 3
Message 4
Stochastic Encoding: 64-QAM Example-III
Stochastic Encoding: 64-QAM Example-IV
Stochastic Encoding: 64-QAM Example-V

Message 1
Message 2
Message 3
Message 4
Csiszar and Korner considered the general wiretap channel in 1978.

They extended Wyner’s model in two ways

– Eve’s signal is not necessarily a degraded version of Bob’s signal.
– There is a common message for both Eve and Bob
General Wiretap Channel: Capacity-Equivocation Region

- Capacity-equivocation region is obtained as union of rate triples \((R_0, R_1, R_e)\) satisfying

\[
R_0 \leq \min\{I(U;Y), I(U;Z)\}
\]

\[
R_0 + R_1 \leq I(V;Y|U) + \min\{I(U;Y), I(U;Z)\}
\]

\[
R_e \leq I(V;Y|U) - I(V;Z|U)
\]

for some \((U, V)\) such that

\[
U \rightarrow V \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z
\]

- New ingredients in the achievable scheme:
  - Superposition coding to accommodate the common message
  - Channel prefixing
Outline of Achievability

- Achievability of the following region is shown

\[ R_0 \leq \min\{I(U;Y), I(U;Z)\} \]

\[ R_0 + R_1 \leq I(X;Y|U) + \min\{I(U;Y), I(U;Z)\} \]

\[ R_e \leq I(X;Y|U) - I(X;Z|U) \]

for some \((U, X)\) such that

\[ U \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z \]

- Channel prefixing, i.e., introduction of a hypothetical channel between \(U\) and \(X\) by means of \(V\), gives the capacity region
General Capacity-Equivocation Region (for $R_0 = 0$)

- When there is no common message, capacity-equivocation region

\[
R \leq I(V;Y) \\
R_e \leq I(V;Y|U) - I(V;Z|U)
\]

for some $(U,V)$ such that

\[U \rightarrow V \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z\]

- Even if common message is not present, we still need two auxiliary rv.s
  - $V$: channel prefixing
  - $U$: rate splitting

- In other words, we still need superposition coding
General Capacity-Equivocation Region (for $R_0 = 0$): Achievability

- Divide message $W$ into three parts: $W'_p, W''_p, W_s$
- $W'_p, W''_p$ are public messages on which there is no secrecy constraint
- $W_s$ is the confidential part which needs to be transmitted in perfect secrecy
- $W'_p$ is transmitted by the first layer, i.e., $U$
- $W''_p, W_s$ are transmitted by the second layer, i.e., $V$
- Similar to Wyner’s scheme, $W''_p$ has two roles
  - Carries part of the public information on which there is no secrecy constraint
  - Provides protection for $W_s$
Secrecy capacity is

\[
C_s = \max_{U \rightarrow V \rightarrow X \rightarrow (Y,Z)} I(V;Y|U) - I(V;Z|U) \\
= \max_{U \rightarrow V \rightarrow X \rightarrow (Y,Z)} \sum_u p_U(u) I(V;Y|U = u) - I(V;Z|U = u) \\
= \max_{V \rightarrow X \rightarrow (Y,Z)} I(V;Y) - I(V;Z)
\]
Secrecy Capacity for General Wiretap Channel: Channel Prefixing

- The secrecy capacity:

\[ C_s = \max_{V \to X \toYZ} I(V; Y) - I(V; Z) \]

- The new ingredient: channel prefixing through the introduction of \( V \).

- No channel prefixing is a special case of channel prefixing by choosing \( V = X \).
Channel Prefixing

- A virtual channel from $V$ to $X$.
- Additional stochastic mapping from the message to the channel input: $W \rightarrow V \rightarrow X$.
- Real channel: $X \rightarrow Y$ and $X \rightarrow Z$. Constructed channel: $V \rightarrow Y$ and $V \rightarrow Z$.

- With channel prefixing: $V \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y, Z$.
- From DPI, both mutual informations decrease, but the difference may increase.
- The secrecy capacity:

$$C_s = \max_{V \rightarrow X \rightarrow YZ} I(V;Y) - I(V;Z)$$
Converse-I

- Csiszar sum lemma is crucial:

**Lemma 1** Let $T^n, U^n$ be length-$n$ random vectors, and $G$ be a random variable. We have

$$
\sum_{i=1}^{n} I(U_{i+1}^{n}; T_i | G, T^{i-1}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(T^{i-1}; U_i | G, U_i^{n})
$$

- Due to secrecy condition, we have

$$
I(W_s; Z^n) \leq n\gamma_n
$$

where $\gamma_n \to 0$ as $n \to \infty$.

- Fano’s lemma implies

$$
H(W_s | Y^n) \leq n\epsilon_n
$$

where $\epsilon_n \to 0$ as $n \to \infty$. 
• Thus, we have

\[ nR_s = H(W_s) \]
\[ \leq I(W_s; Y^n) + n\varepsilon_n \]
\[ \leq I(W_s; Y^n) - I(W_s; Z^n) + n(\varepsilon_n + \gamma_n) \]
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_s; Y_i|Y_{i-1}) - I(W_s; Z_i|Z_i^n) + n(\varepsilon_n + \gamma_n) \]
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_s; Z_i^n; Y_i|Y_{i-1}) - I(W_s; Y_{i-1}; Z_i|Z_i^n) + n(\varepsilon_n + \gamma_n) \]
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_s; Y_i|Y_{i-1}, Z_i^n) - I(W_s; Z_i^n; Y_{i-1}) + I(Z_i^n; Y_i|Y_{i-1}) - I(Y_{i-1}; Z_i^n) + n(\varepsilon_n + \gamma_n) \]
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(W_s; Y_i|Y_{i-1}, Z_i^n) - I(W_s; Z_i^n; Y_{i-1}) + n(\varepsilon_n + \gamma_n) \]

where the underlined terms are equal due to Csiszar sum lemma.
We define

\[ U_i = Y_i^{i-1}Z_i^n \]
\[ V_i = W_sU_i \]

which satisfy

\[ U_i \rightarrow V_i \rightarrow X_i \rightarrow Y_i, Z_i \]

Thus, we have

\[ nR_s \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(V_i;Y_i|U_i) - I(V_i;Z_i|U_i) + n(\varepsilon_n + \gamma_n) \]

After single-letterization

\[ R_s \leq I(V;Y|U) - I(V;Z|U) \]

Thus, we have

\[ C_s \leq \max_{U \rightarrow V \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y, Z} I(V;Y|U) - I(V;Z|U) \]
\[ = \max_{V \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y, Z} I(V;Y) - I(V;Z) \]
Reduction to the Degraded Case

• If the channel is degraded, i.e.,

\[ X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z \]

we have

\[
I(X;Y|V) - I(X;Z|V) = I(X;Y,Z|V) - I(X;Z|V) \\
= I(X;Y|V,Z) \\
\geq 0
\]

where \( V \) is such that \( V \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z \).

• Hence, for degraded wiretap channel, we have

\[
C_s = \max_{V \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y,Z} I(V;Y) - I(V;Z) \\
\leq \max_{V \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y,Z} I(V;Y) - I(V;Z) + I(X;Y|V) - I(X;Z|V) \\
= \max_{V \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y,Z} I(V,X;Y) - I(V,X;Z) \\
= \max_{V \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y,Z} I(X;Y) - I(X;Z) + I(V;Y|X) - I(V;Z|X) \\
\leq \max_{X \rightarrow Y,Z} I(X;Y) - I(X;Z)
\]
Leung-Yang-Cheong and Hellman considered the Gaussian wire-tap channel in 1978.

\[
Y = X + N_Y \\
Z = X + N_Z
\]

Key observation: Capacity-equivocation region depends on the marginal distributions \( p(y|x) \) and \( p(z|x) \), but not the joint distribution \( p(y,z|x) \).

Gaussian case: Capacity-equivocation region does not depend on the correlation between \( N_Y \) and \( N_Z \).
Eve’s signal is Bob’s signal plus Gaussian noise, or vice versa: a *degraded* wiretap channel:

- If $\sigma_Y^2 \geq \sigma_Z^2$, $Y = Z + \tilde{N}$
  
  $$X \rightarrow Z \rightarrow Y$$

- If $\sigma_Z^2 \geq \sigma_Y^2$, $Z = Y + \tilde{N}$
  
  $$X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$$

No channel prefixing is necessary and Gaussian signalling is optimal.

The *secrecy capacity*:

$$C_s = \max_{X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z} I(X;Y) - I(X;Z)$$

(1)

We know that Gaussian $X$ maximizes both $I(X;Y)$ and $I(X;Z)$.

*What maximizes the difference?*
Gaussian Wiretap Channel – Secrecy Capacity

- Secrecy capacity can be obtained in three ways:
  - Entropy-power inequality
    \[ e^{2h(U+V)} \geq e^{2h(U)} + e^{2h(V)} \]
  - I-MMSE formula
    \[ I(X; \sqrt{\text{snr}}X + N) = \frac{1}{2} \int_{0}^{\text{snr}} \text{mmse}(X / \sqrt{\text{snr}}X + N) \, dt \]
  - Conditional maximum entropy theorem
    \[ h(V|U) \leq h(V^G|U^G) \]
Gaussian Wiretap Channel Secrecy Capacity via EPI

- Using entropy-power inequality:

\[ I(X;Y) - I(X;Z) = I(X;Y) - I(X;Y + \tilde{N}) \]

\[ = h(Y) - h(Y + \tilde{N}) - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\sigma_Y^2}{\sigma_Z^2} \]

\[ \leq h(Y) - \frac{1}{2} \log (e^{2h(Y)} + 2\pi e(\sigma_Z^2 - \sigma_Y^2)) - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\sigma_Y^2}{\sigma_Z^2} \]

\[ \leq \frac{1}{2} \log (2\pi e)(P + \sigma_Y^2) - \frac{1}{2} \log ((2\pi e)(P + \sigma_Y^2) + (2\pi e)(\sigma_Z^2 - \sigma_Y^2)) - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\sigma_Y^2}{\sigma_Z^2} \]

\[ = \frac{1}{2} \log \left(1 + \frac{P}{\sigma_Y^2}\right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left(1 + \frac{P}{\sigma_Z^2}\right) \]

\[ = C_B - C_E \]

which can be achieved by Gaussian \( X \).

- The secrecy capacity:

\[ C_s = \max_{X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z} I(X;Y) - I(X;Z) = [C_B - C_E]^+ \]

i.e., the difference of two capacities.
Caveat: Need Channel Advantage

The secrecy capacity: \( C_s = [C_B - C_E]^+ \)

**Bob’s channel is better**

\[
W \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow \hat{W} \quad (\text{Bob})
\]

\[
W \rightarrow Z \rightarrow H(W | Z^n) \quad (\text{Eve})
\]

Positive secrecy

\[
C_s = C_B - C_E
\]

**Eve’s channel is better**

\[
Y \rightarrow \hat{W} \quad (\text{Bob})
\]

\[
W \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow \hat{W} \quad (\text{Bob})
\]

\[
W \rightarrow Z \rightarrow H(W | Z^n) \quad (\text{Eve})
\]

No secrecy

\[
C_s = 0
\]
Outlook at the End of 1970s and Transition into 2000s

- Information theoretic secrecy is extremely powerful:
  - no limitation on Eve’s computational power
  - no limitation on Eve’s available information
  - yet, we are able to provide secrecy to the legitimate user
  - **unbreakable, provable, and quantifiable** (in bits/sec/hertz) secrecy

- We seem to be at the mercy of the nature:
  - if Bob’s channel is stronger, positive perfect secrecy rate
  - if Eve’s channel is stronger, no secrecy

- We need channel advantage. Can we create channel advantage?

- Wireless channel provides many options:
  - time, frequency, multi-user diversity
  - cooperation via overheard signals
  - use of multiple antennas
  - signal alignment
Fading Wiretap Channel

- In the Gaussian wiretap channel, secrecy is not possible if

\[ C_B \leq C_E \]

- Fading provides time-diversity: Can it be used to obtain/improve secrecy?
MIMO Wiretap Channel

- In SISO Gaussian wiretap channel, secrecy is not possible if

\[ C_B \leq C_E \]

- Multiple antennas improve reliability and rates. How about secrecy?
Broadcast (Downlink) Channel

- In cellular communications: base station to end-users channel can be eavesdropped.
- This channel can be modelled as a broadcast channel with an external eavesdropper.
Internal Security within a System

- Legitimate users may have **different security clearances**.
- Some legitimate users may have **paid for some content**, some may not have.
- Broadcast channel with two confidential messages.
Multiple Access (Uplink) Channel

- In cellular communications: end-user to the base station channel can be eavesdropped.
- This channel can be modelled as a multiple access channel with an external eavesdropper.
Cooperative Channels

- **Overheard information** at communicating parties:
  - Forms the basis for cooperation
  - Results in loss of confidentiality

- How do cooperation and secrecy interact?

- Simplest model to investigate this interaction: relay channel with secrecy constraints.
  - Can Charles help without learning the messages going to Bob?
In the Gaussian wiretap channel, secrecy is not possible if
\[ C_B \leq C_E \]

Fading provides a time-diversity: It can be used to obtain/improve secrecy.

Two scenarios for the **ergodic** secrecy capacity:
- **CSIT of both Bob and Eve**: Liang-Poor-Shamai, Li-Yates-Trappe, Gopala-Lai-El Gamal.
- **CSIT of Bob only**: Khisti-Tchamkerten-Wornell, Li-Yates-Trappe, Gopala-Lai-El Gamal.
- **Fading** channel model:

  \[ Y = h_Y X + N_Y \]
  \[ Z = h_Z X + N_Z \]

- Assume full CSIT and CSIR.
- Parallel wiretap channel provides the framework to analyze the fading wiretap channel.
Secrecy capacity of the parallel wiretap channel can be obtained as follows [Liang-Poor-Shamai, 2008]

\[
C_s = \max_{V \rightarrow X^L \rightarrow (Y^L, Z^L)} I(V; Y_1, \ldots, Y_L) - I(V; Z_1, \ldots, Z_L)
\]

\[
= \max_{V \rightarrow X^L \rightarrow (Y^L, Z^L)} \sum_{l=1}^{L} I(V; Y_l|Y^{l-1}) - I(V; Z_l|Z^L_{l+1})
\]

\[
= \max_{V \rightarrow X^L \rightarrow (Y^L, Z^L)} \sum_{l=1}^{L} I(V, Z^L_{l+1}; Y_l|Y^{l-1}) - I(V, Y^{l-1}; Z_l|Z^L_{l+1}) + I(Z^L_{l+1}; Y_l|Y^{l-1}, V)
\]

\[
- I(Y^{l-1}; Z_l|Z^L_{l+1}, V)
\]

\[
= \max_{V \rightarrow X^L \rightarrow (Y^L, Z^L)} \sum_{l=1}^{L} I(V, Z^L_{l+1}; Y_l|Y^{l-1}) - I(V, Y^{l-1}; Z_l|Z^L_{l+1})
\]

where underlined terms are identical due to Csiszar sum lemma.
Fading Wiretap Channel-IV

\[ C_s = \max_{V \rightarrow X \rightarrow (Y, Z)} \sum_{l=1}^{L} I(V, Z_{l+1}^L; Y_l|Y^{l-1}) - I(V, Y^{l-1}; Z_l|Z_{l+1}^L) \]

\[ = \max_{V \rightarrow X \rightarrow (Y, Z)} \sum_{l=1}^{L} I(V; Y_l|Y^{l-1}, Z_{l+1}^L) - I(V; Z_l|Z_{l+1}^L, Y^{l-1}) + I(Z_{l+1}^L; Y_l|Y^{l-1}) - I(Y^{l-1}; Z_l|Z_{l+1}^L) \]

\[ = \max_{V \rightarrow X \rightarrow (Y, Z)} \sum_{l=1}^{L} I(V; Y_l|Y^{l-1}, Z_{l+1}^L) - I(V; Z_l|Z_{l+1}^L, Y^{l-1}) \]

\[ = \max_{V \rightarrow X \rightarrow (Y, Z)} \sum_{l=1}^{L} I(V, Y^{l-1}, Z_{l+1}^L; Y_l|Y^{l-1}, Z_{l+1}^L) - I(V, Y^{l-1}, Z_{l+1}^L; Z_l|Z_{l+1}^L, Y^{l-1}) \]

\[ = \max_{\{Q_l \rightarrow V_l \rightarrow X_l \rightarrow (Y_l, Z_l)\}} \sum_{l=1}^{L} I(V_l; Y_l|Q_l) - I(V_l; Z_l|Q_l) \]

\[ = \sum_{l=1}^{L} \max_{Q_l \rightarrow V_l \rightarrow X_l \rightarrow (Y_l, Z_l)} I(V_l; Y_l|Q_l) - I(V_l; Z_l|Q_l) \]

\[ = \sum_{l=1}^{L} \max_{V_l \rightarrow X_l \rightarrow (Y_l, Z_l)} I(V_l; Y_l) - I(V_l; Z_l) \quad \left(= \sum_{l=1}^{L} C_{sl}\right) \]
Each realization of \((h_Y, h_Z)\) can be viewed as a sub-channel occurring with some probability.

Averaging over all possible channel realizations gives the ergodic secrecy capacity

\[
C_s = \max E \left[ \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{h_Y^2 P(h_Y, h_Z)}{\sigma_Y^2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{h_Z^2 P(h_Y, h_Z)}{\sigma_Z^2} \right) \right]
\]

where the maximization is over all power allocation schemes \(P(h_Y, h_Z)\) satisfying constraint

\[
E [P(h_Y, h_Z)] \leq P
\]

If \(\frac{h_Y^2}{\sigma_Y^2} \leq \frac{h_Z^2}{\sigma_Z^2}\), term inside the expectation is negative:

\[
P(h_Y, h_Z) = 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \frac{h_Y^2}{\sigma_Y^2} \leq \frac{h_Z^2}{\sigma_Z^2}
\]

Optimal power allocation is water-filling over the states \((h_Y, h_Z)\) satisfying

\[
\frac{h_Y^2}{\sigma_Y^2} \geq \frac{h_Z^2}{\sigma_Z^2}
\]
Gaussian MIMO Wiretap Channel-I

- Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel:
  \[
  Y = H_Y X + N_Y \\
  Z = H_Z X + N_Z
  \]

- As opposed to the SISO case, MIMO channel is not necessarily degraded
- As opposed to fading SISO, it cannot be expressed as a parallel channel
Gaussian MIMO Wiretap Channel-II

- Secrecy capacity [Shafiee-Liu-Ulukus, Khisti-Wornell, Oggier-Hassibi, Liu-Shamai]:

\[
C_S = \max_{V \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y, Z} I(V; Y) - I(V; Z)
\]

\[
= \max_{K: \text{tr}(K) \leq P} \frac{1}{2} \log \left| H_M K H_M^\top + I \right| - \frac{1}{2} \log \left| H_E K H_E^\top + I \right|
\]

- No channel prefixing is necessary and Gaussian signalling is optimal.

- As opposed to the SISO case, \( C_S \neq C_B - C_E \).

- Multiple antennas improve reliability and rates. They improve secrecy as well.
Secrecy capacity of any wiretap channel is known as an optimization problem:

\[ C_s = \max_{(V,X)} I(V;Y) - I(V;Z) \]

MIMO wiretap channel is not degraded in general.
- Therefore, \( V = X \) is potentially suboptimal.

There is no general methodology to solve this optimization problem, i.e., find optimal \((V,X)\).

The approach used by [Shafiee-Liu-Ulukus, Khisti-Wornell, Oggier-Hassibi]:
- Compute an achievable secrecy rate by using a potentially suboptimal \((V,X)\):
  \* Jointly Gaussian \((V,X)\) is a natural candidate.
- Find a computable outer bound.
- Show that these two expressions (achievable rate and outer bound) match.
Using Sato’s approach, a computable outer bound can be found:

- Consider the enhanced Bob with observation $\tilde{Y} = (Y, Z)$
- This new channel is degraded, no need for channel prefixing:

$$\max_X I(X; \tilde{Y}) - I(X; Z) = \max_X I(X; Y|Z)$$

- And, optimal $X$ is Gaussian.

This outer bound can be tightened:

- The secrecy capacity is the same for channels having the same marginal distributions
- We can correlate the receiver noises.

The tightened outer bound is:

$$\min \max_X I(X; Y|Z)$$

where the minimization is over all noise correlations.

The outer bound so developed matches the achievable rate.
Insights from the Outer Bound

- Sato-type outer bound is tight
- This outer bound constructs a degraded wiretap channel from the original non-degraded one
- Secrecy capacity of the constructed degraded channel is potentially larger than the original non-degraded one
- However, they turn out to be the same
- Indeed, these observations are a manifestation of channel enhancement:
  - Liu-Shamai provide an alternative proof for secrecy capacity via channel enhancement
Secrecy Capacity via Channel Enhancement

- Aligned Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel

\[ Y = X + N_Y \]
\[ Z = X + N_Z \]

where \( N_Y \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \Sigma_Y) \), \( N_Z \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \Sigma_Z) \).

- Channel input \( X \) is subject to a covariance constraint

\[ E \left[ XX^\top \right] \preceq S \]

- Covariance constraint has advantages
  - A rather general constraint including total power and per-antenna power constraints as special cases
  - Yields an easier analysis
Secrecy Capacity of Degraded Gaussian MIMO Wiretap Channel

- Channel is degraded if it satisfies
  \[ X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z \]
  which is equivalent to have \( \Sigma_Y \preceq \Sigma_Z \)
- In other words, we have \( N_Z = N_Y + \tilde{N} \) where \( \tilde{N} \) is Gaussian with covariance matrix \( \Sigma_Z - \Sigma_Y \)
- Corresponding secrecy capacity
  \[
  C_s = \max_{p(x)} I(X; Y) - I(X; Z)
  \]
  \[
  = \max_{p(x)} h(Y) - h(Z) - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|\Sigma_Y|}{|\Sigma_Z|}
  \]
  \[
  = \max_{p(x)} h(Y) - h(Y + \tilde{N}) - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|\Sigma_Y|}{|\Sigma_Z|}
  \]
  \[
  = \max_{p(x)} -I(\tilde{N}; Y + \tilde{N}) - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|\Sigma_Y|}{|\Sigma_Z|}
  \]
  \[
  = \max_{0 \preceq K \preceq S} \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K + \Sigma_Y|}{|K + \Sigma_Z|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|\Sigma_Y|}{|\Sigma_Z|}
  \]
  \[
  = \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|S + \Sigma_Y|}{|\Sigma_Y|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|S + \Sigma_Z|}{|\Sigma_Z|}
  \]
The following secrecy rate is achievable

\[ C_s \geq \max_{0 \leq K \leq S} \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K + \Sigma_Y|}{|\Sigma_Y|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K + \Sigma_Z|}{|\Sigma_Z|} \]

Optimal covariance matrix \( K^* \) needs to satisfy

\[
(K^* + \Sigma_Y)^{-1} + M = (K^* + \Sigma_Z)^{-1} + M_S \\
K^*M = MK^* = 0 \\
(S - K^*)M_S = M_S(S - K^*) = 0
\]

We enhance the legitimate user as follows

\[
(K^* + \tilde{\Sigma}_Y)^{-1} = (K^* + \Sigma_Y)^{-1} + M
\]

which also implies

\[
(K^* + \tilde{\Sigma}_Y)^{-1} = (K^* + \Sigma_Z)^{-1} + M_S
\]

Thus, \( \tilde{\Sigma}_Y \) satisfies

\[ \tilde{\Sigma}_Y \preceq \Sigma_Y \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{\Sigma}_Y \preceq \Sigma_Z \]
Secrecy Capacity via Channel Enhancement-II

- Enhanced channel:
Secrecy Capacity via Channel Enhancement-III

- Enhanced wiretap channel

\[ \tilde{Y} = X + \tilde{N}_Y \]
\[ Z = X + N_Z \]

where \( \tilde{N}_Y \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \tilde{\Sigma}_Y) \).

- Since \( \tilde{\Sigma}_Y \preceq \{ \Sigma_Y, \Sigma_Z \} \), we have

\[ X \rightarrow \tilde{Y} \rightarrow \{ Y, Z \} \]

- Thus, the enhanced channel is degraded and \( \tilde{C}_s \geq C_s \)

\[ \tilde{C}_s = \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|S + \tilde{\Sigma}_Y|}{|\tilde{\Sigma}_Y|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|S + \Sigma_Z|}{|\Sigma_Z|} \]
Secrecy Capacity via Channel Enhancement-IV

- Although secrecy capacity is potentially improved through the enhancement, indeed, there is a rate preservation

\[
(K^* + \tilde{\Sigma}_Y)^{-1}(S + \tilde{\Sigma}_Y) = (K^* + \Sigma_Z)^{-1}(S + \Sigma_Z)
\]

\[
(K^* + \tilde{\Sigma}_Y)^{-1}\tilde{\Sigma}_Y = (K^* + \Sigma_Y)^{-1}\Sigma_Y
\]

- These identities imply

\[
\frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K^* + \Sigma_Y|}{|\Sigma_Y|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K^* + \Sigma_Z|}{|\Sigma_Z|} = \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K^* + \tilde{\Sigma}_Y|}{|\tilde{\Sigma}_Y|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K^* + \Sigma_Z|}{|\Sigma_Z|}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|S + \tilde{\Sigma}_Y|}{|\tilde{\Sigma}_Y|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|S + \Sigma_Z|}{|\Sigma_Z|}
\]
Secrecy Capacity via Channel Enhancement-V

- We can obtain the secrecy capacity of the original channel as follows [Liu-Shamai, 2009]

\[ C_s \leq \tilde{C}_s \]

\[ = \max_{X \rightarrow \tilde{Y}, Z} E[XX^\top] \preceq S \]

\[ = \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|S + \hat{\Sigma}_Y|}{|\hat{\Sigma}_Y|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|S + \Sigma_Z|}{|\Sigma_Z|} \]

\[ = \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K^* + \hat{\Sigma}_Y|}{|\hat{\Sigma}_Y|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K^* + \Sigma_Z|}{|\Sigma_Z|} \]

\[ = \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K^* + \Sigma_Y|}{|\Sigma_Y|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K^* + \Sigma_Z|}{|\Sigma_Z|} \]

\[ = \max_{0 \leq K \leq S} \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K + \Sigma_Y|}{|\Sigma_Y|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K + \Sigma_Z|}{|\Sigma_Z|} \]
Multiple Access Wiretap Channel

- An external eavesdropper listens in on the communication from end-users to the base station.

- Introduced by Tekin-Yener in 2005:
  - Achievability of positive secrecy rates is shown.
  - Cooperative jamming is discovered.

- Secrecy capacity is unknown in general
• Introduce two independent auxiliary random variables $V_1$ and $V_2$.

\[ W_1 \rightarrow V_1 \rightarrow X_1 \]
\[ W_2 \rightarrow V_2 \rightarrow X_2 \]

Alice

Bob

Charles

Eve

\[ H(W_1,W_2 | Z^n) \]

• An achievable secrecy rate region with channel pre-fixing:

\[ R_1 \leq I(V_1; Y|V_2) - I(V_1; Z) \]
\[ R_2 \leq I(V_2; Y|V_1) - I(V_2; Z) \]
\[ R_1 + R_2 \leq I(V_1, V_2; Y) - I(V_1, V_2; Z) \]

where $p(v_1, v_2, x_1, x_2, y, z)$ factors as $p(v_1)p(v_2)p(x_1|v_1)p(x_2|v_2)p(y,z|x_1,x_2)$. 

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An Achievable Rate Region for Multiple Access Wiretap Channel-II

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<td>( 2^nR₂, 2^nR₂ )</td>
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</table>

Legitimate User

Eavesdropper
An Achievable Rate Region for Multiple Access Wiretap Channel-III

- Achievability can be shown in two steps.
- Show that the following region is achievable:

\[
R_1 \leq I(X_1; Y|X_2) - I(X_1; Z)
\]
\[
R_2 \leq I(X_2; Y|X_1) - I(X_2; Z)
\]
\[
R_1 + R_2 \leq I(X_1, X_2; Y) - I(X_1, X_2; Z)
\]

where \( p(x_1, x_2, y, z) = p(x_1)p(x_2)p(y|x_1)p(z|x_2) \).

- Use channel prefixing at both users:

\[
V_1 \rightarrow X_1
\]
\[
V_2 \rightarrow X_2
\]
An Achievable Rate Region for Multiple Access Wiretap Channel-IV

- Each user generates a codebook independently and uses stochastic encoding:

\[ X_j^n(w_j, \tilde{w}_j), \quad j = 1, 2 \]

where
- \( w_j \) is the \( j \)th message with rate \( R_j \)
- \( \tilde{w}_j \) is the confusion message with rate \( \tilde{R}_j \).

- Total rate sent through by the \( j \)th user is \( R_j + \tilde{R}_j \)

- Legitimate transmitter decodes both \( w_j \) and \( \tilde{w}_j \) for both \( j \):

\[
R_1 + \tilde{R}_1 \leq I(X_1; Y | X_2) \\
R_2 + \tilde{R}_2 \leq I(X_2; Y | X_1) \\
R_1 + R_2 + \tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_2 \leq I(X_1, X_2; Y)
\]
An Achievable Rate Region for Multiple Access Wiretap Channel-V

- $W_1$ and $W_2$ should be transmitted in perfect security:

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} I(W_1, W_2; Z^n) = 0$$

which is ensured if $\tilde{R}_1$ and $\tilde{R}_2$ satisfy

$$\tilde{R}_1 \leq I(X_1; Z|X_2)$$

$$\tilde{R}_2 \leq I(X_2; Z|X_1)$$

$$\tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_2 = I(X_1, X_2; Z)$$

- Total rate of confusion messages is equal to the decoding capability of eavesdropper

- Individual rates can vary as long as total rate is fixed
An Achievable Rate Region for Multiple Access Wiretap Channel-VI

• Hence, the following rate region is achievable

\[ R_1 + \tilde{R}_1 \leq I(X_1;Y|X_2) \]
\[ R_2 + \tilde{R}_2 \leq I(X_2;Y|X_1) \]
\[ R_1 + R_2 + \tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_2 \leq I(X_1,X_2;Y) \]
\[ \tilde{R}_1 \leq I(X_1;Z|X_2) \]
\[ \tilde{R}_2 \leq I(X_2;Z|X_1) \]
\[ \tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_2 = I(X_1,X_2;Z) \]

• Eliminate \( \tilde{R}_1 \) and \( \tilde{R}_2 \) by Fourier-Moztkin elimination

• Use channel prefixing at each user
Gaussian Multiple Access Wiretap Channel: Gaussian Signalling

- Tekin-Yener 2005: Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel

\[ W_1 \rightarrow V_1 \rightarrow X_1 \]

Alice

\[ W_2 \rightarrow V_2 \rightarrow X_2 \]

Charles

Bob

\[ Y \rightarrow \hat{W}_1, \hat{W}_2 \]

\[ Z \rightarrow H(W_1, W_2 | Z^n) \]

Eve

- Achievable secrecy region with no channel prefixing, \( X_1 = V_1, X_2 = V_2 \), Gaussian signals:

\[
R_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + h_1 P_1 \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{g_1 P_1}{1 + g_2 P_2} \right)
\]

\[
R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + h_2 P_2 \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{g_2 P_2}{1 + g_1 P_1} \right)
\]

\[
R_1 + R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + h_1 P_1 + h_2 P_2 \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + g_1 P_1 + g_2 P_2 \right)
\]
Cooperative Jamming


- Cooperative jamming is a form of channel pre-fixing:

  \[ X_1 = V_1 + U_1 \quad \text{and} \quad X_2 = V_2 + U_2 \]

  where \( V_1 \) and \( V_2 \) carry messages and \( U_1 \) and \( U_2 \) are jamming signals.

- Achievable secrecy rate region with cooperative jamming:

  \[
  R_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{h_1 P_1}{1 + h_1 Q_1 + h_2 Q_2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{g_1 P_1}{1 + g_1 Q_1 + g_2 (P_2 + Q_2)} \right)
  \]

  \[
  R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{h_2 P_2}{1 + h_1 Q_1 + h_2 Q_2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{g_2 P_2}{1 + g_1 (P_1 + Q_1) + g_2 Q_2} \right)
  \]

  \[
  R_1 + R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{h_1 P_1 + h_2 P_2}{1 + h_1 Q_1 + h_2 Q_2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{g_1 P_1 + g_2 P_2}{1 + g_1 Q_1 + g_2 Q_2} \right)
  \]

  where \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) are the powers of \( V_1 \) and \( V_2 \) and \( Q_1 \) and \( Q_2 \) are the powers of \( U_1 \) and \( U_2 \).
For the weak eavesdropper case, Gaussian signalling is nearly optimal [Ekrem-Ulukus].

In general, Gaussian signalling is not optimal:

- He-Yener showed that structured codes (e.g., lattice codes) outperform Gaussian codes.
- Structured codes can provide secrecy rates that scale with log SNR.

The secrecy capacity of the multiple access wiretap channel is still open.
Fading Multiple Access Wiretap Channel-I

- They provide achievable secrecy rates based on Gaussian signalling.
- Main assumption: channel state information is known at all nodes.
Fading Multiple Access Wiretap Channel-II

- Achievable rates without cooperative jamming:

\[
R_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} E_{h,g} \left[ \log (1 + h_1 P_1) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{g_1 P_1}{1 + g_2 P_2} \right) \right]
\]

\[
R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} E_{h,g} \left[ \log (1 + h_2 P_2) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{g_2 P_2}{1 + g_1 P_1} \right) \right]
\]

\[
R_1 + R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} E_{h,g} \left[ \log (1 + h_1 P_1 + h_2 P_2) - \frac{1}{2} \log (1 + g_1 P_1 + g_2 P_2) \right]
\]

- Achievable rates with cooperative jamming:

\[
R_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} E_{h,g} \left[ \log \left( 1 + \frac{h_1 P_1}{1 + h_1 Q_1 + h_2 Q_2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{g_1 P_1}{1 + g_1 Q_1 + g_2 (P_2 + Q_2)} \right) \right]
\]

\[
R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} E_{h,g} \left[ \log \left( 1 + \frac{h_2 P_2}{1 + h_1 Q_1 + h_2 Q_2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{g_2 P_2}{1 + g_1 (P_1 + Q_1) + g_2 Q_2} \right) \right]
\]

\[
R_1 + R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} E_{h,g} \left[ \log \left( 1 + \frac{h_1 P_1 + h_2 P_2}{1 + h_1 Q_1 + h_2 Q_2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \log \left( 1 + \frac{g_1 P_1 + g_2 P_2}{1 + g_1 Q_1 + g_2 Q_2} \right) \right]
\]

- In both cases: No scaling with SNR.
Scaling Based Alignment (SBA) – Introduction

\[ Y = h_1 X_1 + h_2 X_2 + N \]
\[ Z = g_1 X_1 + g_2 X_2 + N' \]
Scaling Based Alignment (SBA) – Introduction

- Scaling at the transmitter:
  - Alice multiplies her channel input by the channel gain of Charles to Eve.
  - Charles multiplies his channel input by the channel gain of Alice to Eve.

\[
Y = h_1 X_1 + h_2 X_2 + N \\
Z = g_1 X_1 + g_2 X_2 + N'
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Scaling Based Alignment (SBA) – Introduction

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  - Charles multiplies his channel input by the channel gain of Alice to Eve.

\[
Y = h_1 g_2 X_1 + h_2 g_1 X_2 + N
\]
\[
Z = g_1 g_2 X_1 + g_2 g_1 X_2 + N' \]

- Repetition: Both Alice and Charles repeat their symbols in two consecutive intervals.
Scaling Based Alignment (SBA) – Analysis

- Received signal at Bob (odd and even time indices):
  \[ Y_o = h_{1o}g_{2o}X_1 + h_{2o}g_{1o}X_2 + N_o \]
  \[ Y_e = h_{1e}g_{2e}X_1 + h_{2e}g_{1e}X_2 + N_e \]

- Received signal at Eve (odd and even time indices):
  \[ Z_o = g_{1o}g_{2o}X_1 + g_{2o}g_{1o}X_2 + N'_o \]
  \[ Z_e = g_{1e}g_{2e}X_1 + g_{2e}g_{1e}X_2 + N'_e \]

- At high SNR (imagine negligible noise):
  - Bob has two independent equations.
  - Eve has one equation.

  to solve for \( X_1 \) and \( X_2 \).
Scaling Based Alignment (SBA) – Analysis

- Received signal at Bob (odd and even time indices):
  \[ Y_o = h_{1o}g_{2o}X_1 + h_{2o}g_{1o}X_2 \]
  \[ Y_e = h_{1e}g_{2e}X_1 + h_{2e}g_{1e}X_2 \]

- Received signal at Eve (odd and even time indices):
  \[ Z_o = g_{1o}g_{2o}X_1 + g_{2o}g_{1o}X_2 \]
  \[ Z_e = g_{1e}g_{2e}X_1 + g_{2e}g_{1e}X_2 \]

- At high SNR (imagine negligible noise):
  - Bob has two independent equations.
  - Eve has one equation.

to solve for \( X_1 \) and \( X_2 \).
Scaling Based Alignment (SBA) – Achievable Rates

- Following rates are achievable:

\[
R_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} E_{h,g} \left\{ \log \left( 1 + (|h_{1o}g_{2o}|^2 + |h_{1e}g_{2e}|^2)P_1 \right) - \log \left( 1 + \frac{(|g_{1o}g_{2o}|^2 + |g_{1e}g_{2e}|^2)P_1}{1 + (|g_{1o}g_{2o}|^2 + |g_{1e}g_{2e}|^2)P_2} \right) \right\}
\]

\[
R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} E_{h,g} \left\{ \log \left( 1 + (|h_{2o}g_{1o}|^2 + |h_{2e}g_{1e}|^2)P_2 \right) - \log \left( 1 + \frac{(|g_{1o}g_{2o}|^2 + |g_{1e}g_{2e}|^2)P_2}{1 + (|g_{1o}g_{2o}|^2 + |g_{1e}g_{2e}|^2)P_1} \right) \right\}
\]

\[
R_1 + R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} E_{h,g} \left\{ \log \left( 1 + (|h_{1o}g_{2o}|^2 + |h_{1e}g_{2e}|^2)P_1 + (|h_{2o}g_{1o}|^2 + |h_{2e}g_{1e}|^2)P_2 \right) + |h_{1e}h_{2o}g_{1o}g_{2e} - h_{1o}h_{2e}g_{1e}g_{2o}|^2P_1P_2 \right\}
\]

\[
- \log \left( 1 + (|g_{1o}g_{2o}|^2 + |g_{1e}g_{2e}|^2)(P_1 + P_2) \right) \right\}
\]

where

\[
E \left[ (|g_{2o}|^2 + |g_{2e}|^2)P_1 \right] \leq \tilde{P}_1
\]

\[
E \left[ (|g_{1o}|^2 + |g_{1e}|^2)P_2 \right] \leq \tilde{P}_2
\]

- \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) should be understood as \( P_1(h, g) \) and \( P_2(h, g) \).
Scaling Based Alignment (SBA) – Scaling with SNR and Secure DoF

- Secrecy sum rate achievable by the SBA scheme:

\[
R_s = \frac{1}{2} E_{n,g} \left\{ \log \left( 1 + \left( |h_{1o}g_{2o}|^2 + |h_{1e}g_{2e}|^2 \right) P_1 + \left( |h_{2o}g_{1o}|^2 + |h_{2e}g_{1e}|^2 \right) P_2 \right. \\
+ |h_{1e}h_{2o}g_{1o}g_{2e} - h_{1o}h_{2e}g_{1e}g_{2o}|^2 P_1 P_2 \left. \right) \\
- \log \left( 1 + \left( |g_{1o}g_{2o}|^2 + |g_{1e}g_{2e}|^2 \right) (P_1 + P_2) \right) \right\}
\]

- A total of \( \frac{1}{2} \) secure DoF is achievable.
Ergodic Secret Alignment (ESA)

- Instead of repeating at two consecutive time instances, repeat at well-chosen time instances.
- At any given instant $t_1$, received signal at Bob and Eve is,

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
Y_{t_1} \\
Z_{t_1}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
h_1 & h_2 \\
g_1 & g_2
\end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix}
X_1 \\
X_2
\end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix}
N_{t_1} \\
N'_{t_1}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

- Repeat at time instance $t_2$, and the received signal at Bob and Eve is,

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
Y_{t_2} \\
Z_{t_2}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
h_1 & -h_2 \\
g_1 & g_2
\end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix}
X_1 \\
X_2
\end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix}
N_{t_2} \\
N'_{t_2}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

- This creates orthogonal MAC to Bob, but a scalar MAC to Eve.
Ergodic Secret Alignment (ESA) – Achievable Rates

- Following rates are achievable:

\[
R_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} E_{h,g} \left\{ \log (1 + 2|h_1|^2 P_1) - \log \left(1 + \frac{2|g_1|^2 P_1}{1 + 2|g_2|^2 P_2} \right) \right\}
\]

\[
R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} E_{h,g} \left\{ \log (1 + 2|h_2|^2 P_2) - \log \left(1 + \frac{2|g_2|^2 P_2}{1 + 2|g_1|^2 P_1} \right) \right\}
\]

\[
R_1 + R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} E_{h,g} \left\{ \log (1 + 2|h_1|^2 P_1) + \log (1 + 2|h_2|^2 P_2) - \log \left(1 + 2(|g_1|^2 P_1 + |g_2|^2 P_2) \right) \right\}
\]

where \( E[P_1] \leq \bar{P}_1 \) and \( E[P_2] \leq \bar{P}_2 \).

- \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) should be understood as \( P_1(h, g) \) and \( P_2(h, g) \).

- Rates scale with SNR as in the SBA scheme: A total of \( \frac{1}{2} \) secure DoF is achievable.

- Rates achieved here are larger than those with our first scheme.

- Using cooperative jamming on the top of the ESA scheme achieves even larger secrecy rates.
Rates with Gaussian signalling (with or without cooperative jamming) do not scale.

Rates with scaling based alignment (SBA) and ergodic secret alignment (ESA) scale.

ESA performs better than SBA.
Broadcast Channel with an External Eavesdropper

- In cellular communications: base station to end-users channel can be eavesdropped.
- This channel can be modelled as a broadcast channel with an external eavesdropper.
- In general, the problem is intractable for now.
- Even without an eavesdropper, optimal transmission scheme is unknown.
Degraded Broadcast Channel with an External Eavesdropper-I

- Observations of receivers and the eavesdropper satisfy a certain order.
- This generalizes Wyner’s model to a multi-receiver (broadcast) setting.

\[
W_1, W_2 \quad X \quad Y_1 \quad Y_2 \quad Z \quad H(W_1, W_2 | Z^n)
\]

- Gaussian multi-receiver wiretap channel is an instance of this channel model.
- Plays a significant role in the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel.
- The secrecy capacity region is obtained by Bagherikaram-Motahari-Khandani for \( K = 2 \) and by Ekrem-Ulukus for arbitrary \( K \).
• Capacity region for degraded broadcast channel:

\[ R_1 \leq I(X;Y_1|U) \]
\[ R_2 \leq I(U;Y_2) \]

where \( U \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y_1, Y_2 \)

• Capacity region is achieved by superposition coding

• Using superposition coding with stochastic encoding, the secrecy capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel with an external eavesdropper can be obtained:

\[ R_1 \leq I(X;Y_1|U) - I(X;Z|U) \]
\[ R_2 \leq I(U;Y_2) - I(U;Z) \]

where \( U \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y_1, Y_2, Z \)
DegradedBroadcastChannelwithanExternalEavesdropper-III

- \( U^n(\tilde{w}_2, \tilde{w}_2) \) and \( X^n(w_1, \tilde{w}_1, w_2, \tilde{w}_2) \):

\[
R_1 + \bar{R}_1 \leq I(X;Y_1|U)
\]
\[
R_2 + \bar{R}_2 \leq I(U;Y_2)
\]

and

\[
I(U;Z) \leq \bar{R}_2
\]
\[
I(X;Z|U) \leq \bar{R}_1
\]
Gaussian Broadcast Channel with an External Eavesdropper-I

• Channel model:

\[ Y_1 = X + N_1 \]
\[ Y_2 = X + N_2 \]
\[ Z = X + N_Z \]

where \( E[X^2] \leq P \) and

\[ \sigma_1^2 \leq \sigma_2^2 \leq \sigma_Z^2 \]

which is equivalent to

\[ X \rightarrow Y_1 \rightarrow Y_2 \rightarrow Z \]

• Since channel is degraded, secrecy capacity region is given in the following single-letter form:

\[ R_1 \leq I(X;Y_1|U) - I(X;Z|U) \]
\[ R_2 \leq I(U;Y_2) - I(U;Z) \]

where \( E[X^2] \leq P \).
Gaussian Broadcast Channel with an External Eavesdropper-I

- Channel model:

\[ Y_1 = X + N_1 \]
\[ Y_2 = X + N_2 \]
\[ Z = X + N_Z \]

where \( E[X^2] \leq P \) and

\[ \sigma_1^2 \leq \sigma_2^2 \leq \sigma_Z^2 \]

which is equivalent to

\[ X \rightarrow Y_1 \rightarrow Y_2 \rightarrow Z \]

- Since channel is degraded, secrecy capacity region is given in the following single-letter form:

\[ R_1 \leq I(X;Y_1|U) - I(X;Z|U) \]
\[ R_2 \leq I(U;Y_2) - I(U;Z) \]

where \( E[X^2] \leq P \).
• Using jointly Gaussian \((U, X)\) in the single-letter description, we obtain

\[
R_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\alpha P + \sigma_1^2}{\sigma_1^2} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\alpha P + \sigma_Z^2}{\sigma_Z^2}
\]

\[
R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{P + \sigma_2^2}{\alpha P + \sigma_2^2} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{P + \sigma_Z^2}{\alpha P + \sigma_Z^2}
\]

• Indeed, this is the secrecy capacity region
Gaussian Broadcast Channel with an External Eavesdropper-III

- Secrecy rate of the second user:

\[ R_2 \leq I(X; Y_2 | U) - I(X; Z | U) \]

\[ = \left[ h(Y_2) - h(Z) \right] - \left[ h(Y_2 | U) - h(Z | U) \right] \]

where red term can be bounded as

\[ h(Y_2) - h(Z) \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{P + \sigma_2^2}{P + \sigma_Z^2} \]

as we did for the single-user Gaussian wiretap channel.

- Due to the degradedness,

\[ h(Y_2 | U) - h(Z | U) = h(Y_2 + \tilde{N}_2 | U, \tilde{N}_2) - h(Y_2 + \tilde{N}_2 | U) = -I(\tilde{N}_2; Y_2 + \tilde{N}_2 | U) \]

which is bounded as

\[ \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\sigma_2^2}{\sigma_Z^2} \leq h(Y_2 | U) - h(Z | U) \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{P + \sigma_2^2}{P + \sigma_Z^2} \]
**Gaussian Broadcast Channel with an External Eavesdropper-IV**

- Hence, there exists $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ such that

$$h(Y_2|U) - h(Z|U) = \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\alpha P + \sigma_Z^2}{\alpha P + \sigma_2^2}$$

which implies

$$R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{P + \sigma_2^2}{\alpha P + \sigma_2^2} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{P + \sigma_Z^2}{\alpha P + \sigma_Z^2}$$

- Next, we bound the first user’s secrecy rate

$$R_1 \leq I(X;Y_1|U) - I(X;Z|U)$$

$$= h(Y_1|U) - h(Z|U) - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\sigma_1^2}{\sigma_Z^2}$$

subject to the constraint

$$h(Y_2|U) - h(Z|U) = \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\alpha P + \sigma_2^2}{\alpha P + \sigma_Z^2}$$
Gaussian Broadcast Channel with an External Eavesdropper-V

- We use Costa’s entropy-power inequality
- Due to degradedness, we have

\[ Y_2 = Y_1 + \sqrt{t^*}(\tilde{N}_1 + \tilde{N}_2) \]

where

\[ t^* = \frac{\sigma_2^2 - \sigma_1^2}{\sigma_Z^2 - \sigma_1^2} \]

- Hence,

\[
e^2 \left[ h(Y_2|U) - h(Z|U) \right] \geq t^* + (1 - t^*)^2 \left[ h(Y_1|U) - h(Z|U) \right]
\]

- Using the values of \( t^* \) and \( h(Y_2|U) - h(Z|U) \), we have

\[
h(Y_1|U) - h(Z|U) \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\alpha P + \sigma_1^2}{\alpha P + \sigma_Z^2}
\]

which implies

\[
R_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\alpha P + \sigma_1^2}{\sigma_1^2} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\alpha P + \sigma_Z^2}{\sigma_Z^2}
\]
Broadcast Channel with an External Eavesdropper-General Case

- Superposition coding with stochastic encoding is not optimal.
- An achievable rate region can be obtained by using Marton’s inner bound in conjunction with stochastic encoding.
- Marton’s inner bound without secrecy constraints:

\[
R_1 \leq I(V_1; Y_1) \\
R_2 \leq I(V_2; Y_2) \\
R_1 + R_2 \leq I(V_1; Y_1) + I(V_2; Y_2) - I(V_1; V_2)
\]

for some \(V_1, V_2\) satisfying \(V_1, V_2 \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y_1, Y_2\).
- One corner point:

\[
R'_1 = I(V_1; Y_1) \\
R'_2 = I(V_2; Y_2) - I(V_2; V_1)
\]

- Encode \(W_1\) by using \(V_1^n(w_1)\)
- \(V_1^n\) is a non-causally known interference for the second user: Gelfand-Pinsker setting
- Encode \(W_2\) by using \(V_2^n(w_2, l_2)\) where \(l_2\) is for binning.
Broadcast Channel with an External Eavesdropper-General Case

- This achievable scheme can be combined with stochastic encoding (random binning) to obtain an inner bound for broadcast channel with an external eavesdropper:

\[ R_{\text{in}} = \text{conv} \left( R_{12}^{\text{in}} \cup R_{21}^{\text{in}} \right) \]

where \( R_{12}^{\text{in}} \) is

\[
R_1 \leq I(V_1; Y_1) - I(V_1; Z) \\
R_2 \leq I(V_2; Y_2) - I(V_2; V_1, Z)
\]

for some \( V_1, V_2 \) such that \( V_1, V_2 \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y_1, Y_2, Z \)

- This inner bound is tight for Gaussian MIMO case
Broadcast Channel with an External Eavesdropper-General Case

- Encode $W_1$ by using $V_1^n(w_1, \tilde{w}_1)$
- Gelfand-Pinsker setting for the second user
- Encode $W_2$ by using $V_2^n(w_2, \tilde{w}_2, l_2)$
- We have

  $$R_1 + \tilde{R}_1 \leq I(V_1; Y_1)$$
  $$R_2 + \tilde{R}_2 + L_2 \leq I(V_2; Y_2)$$
  $$\tilde{R}_1 = I(V_1; Z)$$
  $$\tilde{R}_2 = I(V_2; Z|V_1)$$
  $$L_2 = I(V_1; V_2)$$

  which gives $R_{12}^{\text{in}}$.

- Changing encoder order gives $R_{21}^{\text{in}}$
Gaussian MIMO Multi-receiver Wiretap Channel-I

- Channel model:

\[ Y_k = H_k X + N_k, \quad k = 1, \ldots, K \]
\[ Z = H_Z X + N_Z \]

- The secrecy capacity region is established by [Ekrem-Ulukus].
Gaussian MIMO Multi-receiver Wiretap Channel-II

- Secrecy capacity region is obtained in three steps
- **As the first step**, the degraded channel is considered
  \[
  Y_1 = X + N_1 \\
  Y_2 = X + N_2 \\
  Z = X + N_Z
  \]

  where the noise covariance matrices satisfy
  \[
  \Sigma_1 \preceq \Sigma_2 \preceq \Sigma_Z
  \]

- Since the secrecy capacity region depends on the marginal distributions, but not the entire joint distribution, this order is equivalent to
  \[
  X \rightarrow Y_1 \rightarrow Y_2 \rightarrow Z
  \]
To obtain the secrecy capacity region of the degraded MIMO channel is tantamount to evaluating the region

\[ R_1 \leq I(X; Y_1 | U) - I(X; Z | U) \]
\[ R_2 \leq I(U; Y_2) - I(U; Z) \]

We show that jointly Gaussian \((U, X)\) is sufficient to evaluate this region

Thus, the secrecy capacity region of the degraded MIMO channel:

\[ R_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K + \Sigma_1|}{|\Sigma_1|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K + \Sigma_Z|}{|\Sigma_Z|} \]
\[ R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|S + \Sigma_2|}{|K + \Sigma_2|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|S + \Sigma_Z|}{|K + \Sigma_Z|} \]

where \(0 \preceq K \preceq S\).
As the second step, the aligned non-degraded channel is considered

\[ Y_1 = X + N_1 \]
\[ Y_2 = X + N_2 \]
\[ Z = X + N_Z \]

where the noise covariance matrices does not satisfy any order

- There is no single-letter formula for the secrecy capacity region
- An achievable secrecy rate region is obtained by using dirty-paper coding in the Marton-type achievable scheme:

\[ R_{\text{in}} = \text{conv} \left( R_{12}^{\text{in}} \cup R_{21}^{\text{in}} \right) \]

where  \( R_{12}^{\text{in}} \) is

\[ R_1 \leq I(V_1;Y_1) - I(V_1;Z) \]
\[ R_2 \leq I(V_2;Y_2) - I(V_2;V_1,Z) \]

for some  \( V_1, V_2 \) such that  \( V_1, V_2 \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y_1, Y_2, Z \)
Gaussian MIMO Multi-receiver Wiretap Channel-V

- The resulting achievable secrecy rate region is

\[ R^{\text{in}}(S) = \text{conv} \left( R^{\text{in}}_{12}(S) \cup R^{\text{in}}_{21}(S) \right) \]

where \( R^{\text{in}}_{12}(S) \) is

\[ R_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|S + \Sigma_1|}{|K + \Sigma_1|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|S + \Sigma_Z|}{|K + \Sigma_Z|} \]
\[ R_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K + \Sigma_2|}{|\Sigma_2|} - \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{|K + \Sigma_Z|}{|\Sigma_Z|} \]

where \( 0 \preceq K \preceq S \).

- This inner bound is shown to be tight by using channel enhancement.
For each point on the boundary of $\mathcal{R}^{\text{in}}(S)$, we construct an enhanced channel

Enhanced channel is degraded, i.e., its secrecy capacity region is known

Secrecy capacity region of the enhanced channel includes that of the original channel

The point on $\mathcal{R}^{\text{in}}(S)$ for which enhanced channel is constructed is also on the boundary of the secrecy capacity region of the enhanced channel

Thus, this point is on the boundary of the secrecy capacity region of the original channel

$\mathcal{R}^{\text{in}}(S)$ is the secrecy capacity region of the original channel
The most general case:

\[ Y_1 = H_1 X + N_1 \]
\[ Y_2 = H_2 X + N_2 \]
\[ Z = H_Z X + N_Z \]

The secrecy capacity region for the most general case is obtained by using some limiting arguments in conjunction with the capacity result for the aligned case.
Broadcast Channels with Confidential Messages-I

- Each user eavesdrops the other user:

\[
\begin{align*}
W_1, W_2 &\quad X \\
W_1, H(W_2 | Y_1^n) &\quad \hat{W}_1, H(W_2 | Y_1^n) \\
W_2, H(W_1 | Y_2^n) &\quad \hat{W}_2, H(W_1 | Y_2^n)
\end{align*}
\]

- In general, problem is intractable for now

- Even without secrecy concerns, optimal transmission scheme is unknown
Using Marton’s inner bound in conjunction with stochastic encoding, we can obtain an achievable rate region:

\[ R_1 \leq I(V_1; Y_1) - I(V_1; Y_2, V_2) \]
\[ R_2 \leq I(V_2; Y_2) - I(V_2; Y_1, V_1) \]

where \( V_1, V_2 \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y_1, Y_2 \).

- Encode \( W_1 \) by using \( V_1^n(w_1, \tilde{w}_1, l_1) \)
- Encode \( W_2 \) by using \( V_2^n(w_2, \tilde{w}_2, l_2) \)
- \( \tilde{w}_1 \) and \( \tilde{w}_2 \) are confusion messages
- \( l_1 \) and \( l_2 \) are for binning
We have

\[ R_1 + \tilde{R}_1 + L_1 \leq I(V_1;Y_1) \]
\[ R_2 + \tilde{R}_2 + L_2 \leq I(V_2;Y_2) \]
\[ \tilde{R}_1 + L_1 = I(V_1;Y_2,V_2) \]
\[ \tilde{R}_2 + L_2 = I(V_2;Y_1,V_1) \]
\[ I(V_1;V_2) \leq L_1 + L_2 \]

which gives us the achievable rate region:

\[ R_1 \leq I(V_1;Y_1) - I(V_1;Y_2,V_2) \]
\[ R_2 \leq I(V_2;Y_2) - I(V_2;Y_1,V_1) \]

This inner bound is tight for Gaussian MIMO channel
Gaussian MIMO Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages

- Each user eavesdrops the other user:

  ![Diagram of Gaussian MIMO Broadcast Channel]

- In SISO case, only one user can have positive secrecy rate.

- In MIMO case also, both users can enjoy positive secrecy rates [Liu-Liu-Poor-Shamai].
Cooperative Channels and Secrecy

- How do cooperation and secrecy interact?
- Is there a trade-off or a synergy?

- Relay channel [He-Yener].
- Cooperative broadcast and cooperative multiple access channels [Ekrem-Ulukus].
Interactions of Cooperation and Secrecy

- Existing cooperation strategies:
  - Decode-and-forward (DAF)
  - Compress-and-forward (CAF)

- Decode-and-forward:
  - Relay decodes (learns) the message.
  - No secrecy is possible.

- Compress-and-forward:
  - Relay does not need to decode the message.
  - Can it be useful for secrecy?

- Achievable secrecy rate when relay uses CAF:
  \[
  I(X_1; Y_1, \hat{Y}_1 | X_2) - I(X_1; Y_2 | X_2) = I(X_1; Y_1 | X_2) - I(X_1; Y_2 | X_2) + I(X_1; \hat{Y}_1 | X_2, Y_1)
  \]
  - Secrecy rate of the wiretap channel
  - Additional term due to CAF
Bob cannot have any positive secrecy rate without cooperation.

Cooperation is beneficial for secrecy if CAF based relaying (cooperation) is employed.

Charles can further improve his own secrecy by joint relaying and jamming.
Multiple Access (Uplink) Channel with Cooperation

- **Overheard information** at users can be used to improve achievable rates.
- This overheard information results in **loss of confidentiality**.
- Should the users ignore it or can it be used to improve (obtain) secrecy?
  - DAF cannot help.
  - CAF may help.
  - CAF may increase rate of a user beyond the decoding capability of the cooperating user.
Example: Gaussian Multiple Access Channel with Cooperation

- Both inter-user links are stronger than the main link.
- Without cooperation, none of the users can get a positive secrecy rate.

- Cooperation is beneficial for secrecy if CAF is employed.
• **Cryptography**
  – at higher layers of the protocol stack
  – based on the assumption of **limited computational power** at Eve
  – vulnerable to large-scale implementation of quantum computers

• **Techniques like frequency hopping, CDMA**
  – at the physical layer
  – based on the assumption of **limited knowledge** at Eve
  – vulnerable to rogue or captured node events

• **Information theoretic security**
  – at the physical layer
  – no assumption on Eve’s computational power
  – no assumption on Eve’s available information
  – based on the assumption of **limited** ?? ?? at Eve
  – **unbreakable, provable, and quantifiable** (in bits/sec/hertz)
  – implementable by **signal processing, communications, and coding** techniques

• Combining all: multi-dimensional, multi-faceted, **cross-layer** security
Two Recurring Themes

- **Creating advantage for the legitimate users:**
  - computational advantage (cryptography)
  - knowledge advantage (spread spectrum)
  - channel advantage (information theoretic security)

- **Exhausting capabilities of the illegitimate entities:**
  - exhausting computational power (cryptography)
  - exhausting searching power (spread spectrum)
  - exhausting decoding capability (information theoretic security)
Conclusions

• Wireless communication is susceptible to eavesdropping and jamming attacks.

• Wireless medium also offers ways to neutralize the loss of confidentiality:
  – time, frequency, multi-user diversity
  – spatial diversity through multiple antennas
  – cooperation via overheard signals
  – signal alignment

• Information theory directs us to methods that can be used to achieve:
  – unbreakable, provable, and quantifiable (in bits/sec/hertz) security
  – irrespective of the adversary’s computation power or inside knowledge

• Resulting schemes implementable by signal processing, communications and coding tech.

• Many open problems...