
## ENEE 457 CBC-MAC Class Exercise



The above version of CBC-MAC is secure for messages of length 3 blocks. Note that CBC-MAC differs from CBC-Enc in the following ways: (1) no random IV is chosen, (2) the intermediate values are not outputted.

1. Consider the following change to the above scheme: The MAC algorithm chooses a random IV and outputs:

$$t := (IV, F_k(F_k(IV \oplus m_1) \oplus m_2) \oplus m_3)$$

Show that this scheme is not secure for 3 block messages.

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Solution: A: query m=m_1,m_2,m_3, receive back t=(IV,\tau) Forge: m'=m'_1,m_2,m_3 and t'=(IV',\tau), where IV'=IV \oplus m_1 \oplus m'_1
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2. Consider the following change to the above scheme: We now consider again macs for 3 block messages  $m_1, m_2, m_3$ . The MAC algorithm outputs:

$$t := (F_k(m_1), F_k(F_k(m_1) \oplus m_2), F_k(F_k(F_k(m_1) \oplus m_2) \oplus m_3)$$

Show that this scheme is not secure for 3 block messages.

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Solution: A: fix target message m^* = m_1^*, m_2^*, m_3^* (1) query m = m_1^*, m_2, m_3, receive back t = (t_1^*, t_2, t_3); (2) query m' = t_1^* \oplus m_2^*, m_2', m_3', receive back t' = (t_2^*, t_2', t_3'); (3) query m'' = t_2^* \oplus m_3^*, m_2', m_3'', receive back t'' = (t_3^*, t_2'', t_3'); Forge: m^* = m_1^*, m_2^*, m_3^* and t^* = t_1^*, t_2^*, t_3^*
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3. Finally, consider the original scheme but now allow the adversary to request signatures on 1, 2, or 3 block messages and output a forgery on a 1,2, or 3 block message. Show that the scheme is insecure in this setting.

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Solution: A: fix target message m^* = m_1^*, m_2^*, m_3^* (1) query m = m_1^*, receive back t_1^*; (2) query m' = t_1^* \oplus m_2^*, receive back t_2^*; (3) query m'' = t_2^* \oplus m_3^*, receive back t_3^*; Forge:m^* = m_1^*, m_2^*, m_3^* and t^* = t_1^*, t_2^*, t_3^*
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Challenge: Can you create a forgery on a 3-block message using only MAC queries for 2 and 3 block messages?