# Introduction to Cryptology 

Lecture 25

## Announcements

- HW10 due next class $(5 / 5)$
- Extra credit due 5/5
- Stay tuned for survey about review session for final exam.


## Agenda

- Last time:
- Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (10.3)
- Public Key Encryption Definitions (11.2)
- El Gamal Encryption (11.4)
- This time:
- RSA Encryption and Weaknesses (11.5)


## RSA Encryption

## CONSTRUCTION 11.25

Let GenRSA be as in the text. Define a public-key encryption scheme as follows:

- Gen: on input $1^{n}$ run $\operatorname{GenRSA}\left(1^{n}\right)$ to obtain $N, e$, and $d$. The public key is $\langle N, e\rangle$ and the private key is $\langle N, d\rangle$.
- Enc: on input a public key $p k=\langle N, e\rangle$ and a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$, compute the ciphertext

$$
c:=\left[m^{e} \bmod N\right] .
$$

- Dec: on input a private key $s k=\langle N, d\rangle$ and a ciphertext $c \in \mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$, compute the message

$$
m:=\left[c^{d} \bmod N\right] .
$$

The plain RSA encryption scheme.

## RSA Example

$$
\begin{gathered}
p=3, q=7, N=21 \\
\phi(N)=12 \\
e=5 \\
d=5
\end{gathered}
$$

$E n c_{(21,5)}(11)=4^{5} \bmod 21=16 \bmod 21$
$D e c_{21,5}(16)=16^{5} \bmod 21=4^{5} \cdot 4^{5} \bmod 21$ $=16 \cdot 16 \bmod 21=4$

## Is Plain-RSA Secure?

- It is deterministic so cannot be secure!


## Additional Attacks

## Additional Attacks

Encrypting short messages using small $e$ :

- When $m<N^{1 / e}$, raising $m$ to the $e$-th power modulo $N$ involves no modular reduction.
- Can compute $m=c^{1 / e}$ over the integers.


## Additional Attacks

Encrypting a partially known message:
Coppersmith's Theorem: Let $p(x)$ be a polynomial of degree $e$. Then in time poly $(\log (N), e)$ one can find all $m$ such that $p(m)=0 \bmod N$ and $m \leq N^{1 / e}$.

In the following, we assume $e=3$.
Assume message is $m=m_{1} \| m_{2}$, where $m_{1}$ is known, but not $m_{2}$.
So $m=2^{k} \cdot m_{1}+m_{2}$.
Define $p(x):=\left(2^{k} \cdot m_{1}+x\right)^{3}-c$.
This polynomial has $m_{2}$ as a root and $m \leq 2^{k} \leq N^{1 / 3}$.

## Additional Attacks

Encrypting related messages:
Assume the sender encrypts both $m$ and $m+\delta$, giving two ciphertexts $c_{1}$ and $c_{2}$.
Define $f_{1}(x):=x^{e}-c_{1}$ and $f_{2}(x):=$ $(x+\delta)^{e}-c_{2}$.
$x=m$ is a root of both polynomials.
$(x-m)$ is a factor of both.
Use algorithm for finding gcd of polynomials.

## Additional Attacks

Sending the same message to multiple receivers:
$p k_{1}=\left\langle N_{1}, 3\right\rangle, p k_{2}=\left\langle N_{2}, 3\right\rangle, p k_{3}=\left\langle N_{3}, 3\right\rangle$.
Eavesdropper sees:
$c_{1}=m^{3} \bmod N_{1}, c_{2}=m^{3} \bmod N_{2}, c_{3}=m^{3} \bmod N_{3}$
Let $N^{*}=N_{1} \cdot N_{2} \cdot N_{3}$.
Using Chinese remainder theorem to find $\hat{c}<N^{*}$ such that:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \hat{c}=c_{1} \bmod N_{1} \\
& \hat{c}=c_{2} \bmod N_{2} \\
& \hat{c}=c_{3} \bmod N_{3} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that $m^{3}$ satisfies all three equations. Moreover, $m^{3}<N^{*}$. Thus, we can solve for $m^{3}=\hat{c}$ over the integers.

## Padded RSA

CONSTRUCTION 11.29
Let GenRSA be as before, and let $\ell$ be a function with $\ell(n) \leq 2 n-4$ for all $n$. Define a public-key encryption scheme as follows:

- Gen: on input $1^{n}$, run $\operatorname{GenRSA}\left(1^{n}\right)$ to obtain $(N, e, d)$. Output the public key $p k=\langle N, e\rangle$, and the private key $s k=\langle N, d\rangle$.
- Enc: on input a public key $p k=\langle N, e\rangle$ and a message $m \in\{0,1\}^{\|N\|-\ell(n)-2}$, choose a random string $r \leftarrow\{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$ and interpret $\hat{m}:=1\|r\| m$ as an element of $\mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$. Output the ciphertext

$$
c:=\left[\hat{m}^{e} \bmod N\right] .
$$

- Dec: on input a private key $s k=\langle N, d\rangle$ and a ciphertext $c \in \mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*}$, compute

$$
\hat{m}:=\left[c^{d} \bmod N\right],
$$

and output the $\|N\|-\ell(n)-2$ least-significant bits of $\hat{m}$.
The padded RSA encryption scheme.

