Solutions

Cryptography--ENEE/CMSC/MATH 456

MAC Class Exercise

Let F be a length-preserving pseudorandom function. Show that each of the following message authentication codes is insecure. (In each case the shared key is a random $k \in \{0,1\}^n$.) ***Challenge: In (1), show how to create a forgery after seeing a single, random message tag pair (m_1||m_2), (t_1||t_2).

1. To authenticate a message $m = m_1||m_2$, where $m_1, m_2 \in \{0,1\}^n$, compute $t := F_k(m_1)||F_k(m_2 \oplus F_k(m_1))$.

Attack: query for a signature on m_1, m_2

get back $t := t_1||t_2$ where $t_1 = F_k(m_1)$ $t_2 = F_k(m_2 \oplus F_k(m_1))$

query for a signature on m_1', m_2'

get back $t' := t_1'||t_2'$ where $t_1' = F_k(m_1')$ $t_2' = F_k(m_2' \oplus F_k(m_1'))$

Forge a signature on m_1'', m_2''

where $m_1'' := m_1$

$m_2'' := t_1 \oplus m_1' = F_k(m_1) \oplus m_1'$

tag $t'' := t_1||t_1'$

2. To authenticate a message $m = m_1||\cdots||m_\ell$, where $m_i \in \{0,1\}^n$, choose $r \in \{0,1\}^n$ at random and compute $t := r||F_k(m_1 \oplus r)||\cdots||F_k(m_\ell \oplus r)$.

Attack: query for a signature on $m = m_1||\cdots||m_\ell$

get back $t := r||t_1||\cdots||t_\ell$

Forge a signature on $m_1 \oplus r||\cdots||m_\ell \oplus r$

by outputting tag

$t' := 0||t_1||\cdots||t_\ell$.