

Cryptography

Lecture 10

Announcements

- HW3 ****extended**** due Monday, 3/2

Agenda

- Last time:
 - PRF Class Exercise
 - Block Ciphers (K/L 3.5)
 - Modes of Operation (K/L 3.6)
- This time:
 - Introduction to MACs
 - Security Definition for MAC (K/L 4.2)
 - Constructing MAC from PRF (K/L 4.3)
 - Begin Discussing Domain Extension for MACs (K/L 4.4)
 - Class Exercise

Message Integrity

- Secrecy vs. Integrity
- Encryption vs. Message Authentication

Message Authentication Codes

Definition: A message authentication code (MAC) consists of three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms $(Gen, Mac, Vrfy)$ such that:

1. The key-generation algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter 1^n and outputs a key k with $|k| \geq n$.
2. The tag-generation algorithm Mac takes as input a key k and a message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, and outputs a tag t .
 $t \leftarrow Mac_k(m)$.
3. The deterministic verification algorithm $Vrfy$ takes as input a key k , a message m , and a tag t . It outputs a bit b with $b = 1$ meaning valid and $b = 0$ meaning invalid.
 $b := Vrfy_k(m, t)$.

It is required that for every n , every key k output by $Gen(1^n)$, and every $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, it holds that $Vrfy_k(m, Mac_k(m)) = 1$.

Unforgeability for MACs

Consider a message authentication code $\Pi = (Gen, Mac, Vrfy)$, any adversary A , and any value n for the security parameter.

Experiment $MACforge_{A,\Pi}(n)$

Adversary $A(1^n)$

Challenger

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$k \leftarrow Gen(1^n)$

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$A^{Mac_k(\cdot)}$

$k \leftarrow Gen(1^n)$

m'

t'

\vdots

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
$k \leftarrow Gen(1^n)$

m'

t'

\vdots

Q is the set of all
messages m'
queried by A



Unforgeability for MACs

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
m'

t'

\vdots

(m, t)


Q is the set of all
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Unforgeability for MACs

Consider a message authentication code $\Pi = (Gen, Mac, Vrfy)$, any adversary A , and any value n for the security parameter.

Experiment $MACforge_{A,\Pi}(n)$



$MACforge_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1$ if both of the following hold:

1. $m \notin Q$
2. $Vrfy_k(m, t) = 1$

Otherwise, $MACforge_{A,\Pi}(n) = 0$

Security of MACs

The message authentication experiment $MACforge_{A,\Pi}(n)$:

1. A key k is generated by running $Gen(1^n)$.
2. The adversary A is given input 1^n and oracle access to $Mac_k(\cdot)$. The adversary eventually outputs (m, t) . Let Q denote the set of all queries that A asked its oracle.
3. A succeeds if and only if (1) $Vrfy_k(m, t) = 1$ and (2) $m \notin Q$. In that case, the output of the experiment is defined to be 1.

Security of MACs

Definition: A message authentication code $\Pi = (Gen, Mac, Vrfy)$ is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A , there is a negligible function neg such that:

$$\Pr[MACforge_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1] \leq neg(n).$$

Strong Unforgeability for MACs

Consider a message authentication code $\Pi = (Gen, Mac, Vrfy)$, any adversary A , and any value n for the security parameter.

Experiment $MACsforge_{A,\Pi}(n)$

Adversary $A(1^n)$

Challenger

$A^{Mac_k(\cdot)}$

$k \leftarrow Gen(1^n)$

m'

t'

\vdots

(m, t)

Q is the set of all
message, tag pairs

(m', t')

queried/received
by A

$MACsforge_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1$ if both of the following hold:

1. $(m, t) \notin Q$
2. $Vrfy_k(m, t) = 1$

Otherwise, $MACsforge_{A,\Pi}(n) = 0$

Strong MACs

The strong message authentication experiment $MACsforge_{A,\Pi}(n)$:

1. A key k is generated by running $Gen(1^n)$.
2. The adversary A is given input 1^n and oracle access to $Mac_k(\cdot)$. The adversary eventually outputs (m, t) . Let Q denote the set of all pairs (m, t) that A asked its oracle.
3. A succeeds if and only if (1) $Vrfy_k(m, t) = 1$ and (2) $(m, t) \notin Q$. In that case, the output of the experiment is defined to be 1.

Strong MACs

Definition: A message authentication code $\Pi = (Gen, Mac, Vrfy)$ is a strong MAC if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A , there is a negligible function neg such that:

$$\Pr[MACsforge_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1] \leq neg(n).$$

Constructing Secure Message Authentication Codes

A Fixed-Length MAC

Let F be a pseudorandom function. Define a fixed-length MAC for messages of length n as follows:

- *Mac*: on input a key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ and a message $m \in \{0,1\}^n$, output the tag $t := F_k(m)$.
- *Vrfy*: on input a key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$, a message $m \in \{0,1\}^n$, and a tag $t \in \{0,1\}^n$, output 1 if and only if $t = F_k(m)$.

Security Analysis

Theorem: If F is a pseudorandom function, then the construction above is a secure fixed-length MAC for messages of length n .

Pseudorandom Function

Definition: Let $F: \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ be an efficient, length-preserving, keyed function. We say that F is a pseudorandom function if for all ppt distinguishers D , there exists a negligible function $negl$ such that:

$$\left| \Pr[D^{F_k(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[D^{f(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1] \right| \leq negl(n).$$

where $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ is chosen uniformly at random and f is chosen uniformly at random from the set of all functions mapping n -bit strings to n -bit strings.

Security of MACs

Definition: A message authentication code $\Pi = (Gen, Mac, Vrfy)$ is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A , there is a negligible function neg such that:

$$\Pr[MACforge_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1] \leq neg(n).$$

Security Analysis

Let A be a ppt adversary trying to break the security of the construction. We construct a distinguisher D that uses A as a subroutine to break the security of the PRF.

Distinguisher D :

D gets oracle access to oracle O , which is either F_k , where F is pseudorandom or f which is truly random.

1. Instantiate $A^{Mac_k(\cdot)}(1^n)$.
2. When A queries its oracle with message m , output $O(m)$.
3. Eventually, A outputs (m^*, t^*) where $m^*, t^* \in \{0,1\}^n$.
4. If $m^* \in Q$, output 0.
5. If $m^* \notin Q$, query $O(m^*)$ to obtain output z^* .
6. If $t^* = z^*$ output 1. Otherwise, output 0.

Security Analysis

Consider the probability D outputs 1 in the case that O is truly random function f vs. O is a pseudorandom function F_k .

- When O is pseudorandom, D outputs 1 with probability $\Pr[MACforge_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1] = \rho(n)$, where ρ is non-negligible.
- When O is random, D outputs 1 with probability at most $\frac{1}{2^n}$. Why?

Security Analysis

D 's distinguishing probability is:

$$\left| \frac{1}{2^n} - \rho(n) \right| = \rho(n) - \frac{1}{2^n}.$$

Since, $\frac{1}{2^n}$ is negligible and $\rho(n)$ is non-negligible, $\rho(n) - \frac{1}{2^n}$ is non-negligible.

This is a contradiction to the security of the PRF.

Domain Extension for MACs